

















































































































A recurring theme in the analysis of competition in the banking sector is the problem 
of stability, and the regulatory constraints that are consequently imposed on economic 
agents operating in this particular market.  
Generally speaking, antitrust intervention in the banking is heavily influenced by 
considerations  of  stability,  because  although  competitive  processes  are  inherently 
selective, and presuppose the possible exit from the market of inefficient competitors, 
this is precisely the eventuality that economic policy decisions seek to avert. Therefore, 
as discussed more in detail in the paragraphs below, the regulation has historically given 
precedence to the stability objective, relegating competition to second place. This is 
borne out by the many structural and operational constraints imposed on the authorities 
and  laws  that  ought  to  safeguard  competition,  and  the  elevation  of  administrative 
barriers to entry. 
Now, under a law and economics perspective, regulatory intervention in the market is 
justified as a means of counteracting the emergence of inefficiencies, and so we can 
apply this same justification to the banking sector, where a specific inefficiency arises 
from  the  macroeconomic  and systemic repercussions  of the normal workings of the 
competitive process. The central problem, in this case, is entrepreneurial risk, which 
must necessarily exist in any competitive market, and plays a decisive role in ordaining 
the  entry  and  exit  of  competitors.  However  in  the  specific  case  of  banks,  price 

























































acceptance  of  excessive  risk,  with  a  resultant  volatility  that  could  potentially  harm 
depositors, and ultimately compromise the stability of the economic system as a whole.  
From the perspective of economic policy, this eventuality translates into a natural friction 
between stability and competition, that cannot always be overcome without penalising one of 
the  two,  and  which  in  the  particular  sector  under  study  is  resolved  at  the  expense  of 
competition.  
The consequence of this approach is that banking market becomes extremely rigid on 
the supply side and structurally not equipped for a competitive orientation, and banks 
come to occupy a privileged position vis-à-vis governments that--to a greater or lesser 
extent,  depending  on  the  countries  and  the  situations--enables  them  to  sidestep  the 
antitrust authorities.  
In such a scenario, the trade-off between stability and competition cannot be totally 
resolved through  traditional antitrust actions,  which are sometimes at odds with  the 
stability objective and hampered by the constraints of the previously defined regulatory 
framework. On the other hand, the supply side approach which characterises a great deal 
of the scientific literature on competition policy appears unable to pursue one objective 
without penalising the other.  
It is precisely these considerations, found in a significant portion of the literature, that 
provide the starting base for the hypothesis of this work--described more in depth in the 
second  section  of  the  paper--and  namely  the  proposal  of  a  novel  demand  side
perspective, i.e. one which focuses on the central role of consumers in the competitive 
process.    If  intervention  on  the  supply  side  is  hampered  D SULRUL  by  the  regulatory 
framework,  it  is  nevertheless  possible  to  implement  pro-competition  actions  on  the 
demand side, for example by enhancing the ability of consumers to change from one 
provider to the other without impacting on the market structure. In operational terms, 
the  proposed  approach  is  to  leverage  consumer  mobility  in  order  to  stimulate  the 
currently weakened competition between firms. This would make it possible to pursue 
the  traditional  antitrust  objectives  of  efficiency  and  welfare  maximisation,  without 
necessarily impacting on stability.  
In the sector under study there exists a simple solution for  implementing  such a 
strategy, which is to reduce the switching costs that currently restrict the mobility of 
consumers  between  different  banks,  with  an  obvious  impact  on  competition.  These 

























































































































If stability is a crucial objective common to all banking and financial systems, control 
of  competition  policy  is  a  fundamental  tool  for  pursuing  such  a  goal.  In  fact,  an 
unrestricted competitive mechanism, with the attendant risk of entry-exit of firms from 
the market, clearly leaves open the possibility of bank failures: the risk that inefficient 
firms  might  fail  is  in  fact  a  necessary  condition  for  the  existence  of  a  competitive 
market. However, in the particular case of banking, because of the ties generally linking 
this sector to the rest of industry, failure of one firm is liable to trigger a contagion or 
domino-effect, causing other banks and financial institutions to fail in their turn, and 
culminating in the collapse of the entire market, with very serious repercussions on the 
economic  system  as  a  whole,  at  both  the  national  and,  ever  more  frequently, 
international level
1.  
Confirming the above is the fact that, in most industrialised countries, the stability 
objective was first enshrined in regulations issued in the aftermath of the 1930s as a 
reaction to  the  Great  Depression,  i.e. the most serious instance of market failure in 
modern history
2. Therefore, even though the national regulations for the safeguard of 
stability developed independently, under separate institutional frameworks and market 
regulation  authorities,  all  systems  nevertheless  exhibit  common  traits.  In  fact,  the 
various  national  frameworks  embody  certain  shared  assumptions  that  can  be 
summarised  as  follows:  1)  the  risk  of  failure  within  the  banking  system,  with  the 
attendant danger of systemic repercussions on the economy as a whole, requires special 
treatment; 2) depositors, in their role as producers of savings, should be protected and 3) 
competition in this specific sector has the effect of increasing risk and must therefore be 
controlled. 
Associated with this is the idea that guaranteeing market power to banks will help 
attenuate the risks to which they are exposed, thereby furthering the goal of stability, as 
expressed in the so-called theory of "charter value"
3. 
The  stability  objective  thus  becomes  a  real  hindrance  to  competition  policy  and 
antitrust enforcement, due to the many special measures and exceptions that it causes to 
be  imposed  (though  here  again  with  national  variants),  for example with  respect to 

























































In recent years the trend has been toward a partial restoration of market competition, 
while  at  the  same  time  seeking  to  safeguard--or  at  least  avoid  significantly 
compromising--the stability objective
4.   
It thus remains an open question whether competition and stability are necessarily in 
opposition,  or  whether  it  is  instead  possible  to  pursue  the  one  without  necessarily 
compromising the other.  The conventional result which emerges from the literature is 
that  resolution  of  the  conflict  through  regulation  is  generally  the  optimal  solution. 
However  the  new  industrial  economics,  as  we discuss below, provides  a means for 
reconciling this position with (at least) a partial safeguard of competition. 
 5HJXODWLRQDVDFRQVWUDLQWRQFRPSHWLWLRQSROLF\
Generally  speaking,  regulation  is  the  practical  mean  by  which  competition  is 
restricted and the stability objective pursued.  But it can also sometimes be deployed to 
support  competition,  which  places  them  in  a  sort  of  no-man’s-land  that  effectively 
renews  the  dilemma  of  stability  versus  competition
5.  On  the  one  hand,  regulation 
restricts competition H[DQWH, creating a safety net to guard against bank failures, as well 
as providing for discretionary H[SRVW interventions, through the monetary authorities, to 
rescue banks that run into difficulty. But on the other hand, regulation also seeks to 
uphold competition through DGKRFmarket interventions in specific situations, for the 
most part in the case of mergers. This is a source of further ambiguity, because in certain 
countries the activities of the central bank will then overlap with those of the antitrust 
authority, generating what is in essence a conflict, as will be clarified below
6.  
Each  national  situation  is  therefore  characterised  by  its  own  set  of  regulatory 
measures, such as prohibitions on listing in the stock-exchange, limits on diversification 
into non-banking products, barriers to entry of foreign banks, restrictions on branching, 
controls on interest rate levels, and capital requirements. 
However  there  is  a  particular  distinction  when  it  comes  to  the  divide  between 
depositors and investors. For the former, the most important thing is stability, whereas 
the latter are mainly interested in transparency and complete information. Therefore, the 
banking and financial markets have different needs which call for distinct regulatory 
frameworks. In this connection, we can identify two main lines of approach adopted by 























































































































frameworks make a distinction between banking and financial market operators, such as 
the  United  States,  where  the  Banking  Law  and  Securities  and  Exchange  Act  were 
enacted almost simultaneously, but as completely separate legislations. And at the other 
end are countries such as Italy, where banks function both as collectors of savings in the 
form of deposits and as financial intermediaries for investors, characterised by a unified 
banking law strongly conditioned by the stability objective, which takes precedence over 
transparency. 
But even within the banking market, regulatory actions can be further sub-classified 
as a function of the relevant market, identified through application of three criteria, of 
which two are borrowed from antitrust practice while one is specific to the sector under 
study:  1)  the  geographical  market,  which  in  this  case  is  delimited  by  national  and 
regional borders; 2) the product market, expressing the substitutability of products as 
perceived  by  consumers  and,  finally,  3)  the  nature  of  the  market  players,  which 
distinguishes between saving banks, and private, cooperative or state-owned banks
7.  
With  regard  to  the  second  criterion,  the  European  Commission  provides  clear 
guidelines  for  identifying  markets,  at  least  for  those  relating  to  traditional  banking 
products
8: 
1)  Retail banking, which comprises the various groups of individual products and 
services  that  banks  offer  to  households  (current  accounts,  savings  accounts, 
bonds, pension funds, short term and long term loans, mortgages)
9 
2)  Corporate  banking,  which  comprises  services  aimed  at  businesses  (domestic 
corporate  banking,  public  sector  banking,  international  credits  to  public 
companies)
10; 
3)  The financial market sector, which comprises services relating to government 
securities and capital markets (trading equities, bonds and derivatives, foreign 
exchange and money markets) 
11 
These three product categories are seen as giving rise to distinct markets, due to 
differences in both the composition of demand and the nature of the offerings, which are 
provided  through  different  channels.  And,  according  to  antitrust  practice,  each 
individual product category can then be further broken down into a series of separate 
product  markets--known  as  submarkets--corresponding  for  example  to  different 


























































Naturally, in defining relevant markets it is also necessary to carefully consider the 
ongoing evolution of the Internet and electronic commerce, which may introduce new 
classifications.    In  fact,  the  future  prospect  of  electronic  banking,  with  no need for 
physical branch banks, would entail a relaxation of the geographical constraint and a 
general  increase  in  competition.  However  this  prospective  development  is  not 
considered  in  the  present  work,  nor in the cited  literature, because it is  still poorly 
defined, and in any case negligible compared with the other activities. In the current 
scenario, the uptake of e-banking is still hampered by a variety of constraints, arising 
from  the  need  to  obtain  information  about  clients,  the  substantial  advertising 
investments  required  to  establish  a  new  product,  and  the  difficulty  of  stipulating 
contracts on-line
13.  
The three banking markets listed above have different attributes from a regulatory 
and competition-policy perspective. This work proposes to look more in depth at the 
retail  market,  i.e.  the  specific  market  of  products  offered  by  banking institutions to 
households, examining its characteristics from the competitive standpoint. The analysis 
will illustrate how, from a supply side perspective, the regulatory framework is a major 
obstacle to the development of policies for competition in this market. These limitations 
are discussed more in detail in the paragraphs that follow.  
 &RPSHWLWLRQLQEDQNLQJODZDQGSUDFWLFH
Competition  policy  in  banking  is  different  from  competition  policy  in  any  other 
market. This peculiarity of banking policy can be traced back to the special charters 
granted to banks, and has been perpetuated to this day by a continuing friction between 
the  need  to  guarantee  stability  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  sustain  entrepreneurial 
opportunity and productive efficiency on the other.  
Bank competition policy arose simultaneously with the birth of the banking market 
itself, and therefore long predates the advent of national antitrust laws. However, after 
the 1930s such policies were everywhere affected by a growing tension between the 
competition objective and the need to protect the national economic system as a whole 
from the risk of bank failure. 
As  a  result  of  this,  the  national banking laws  placed very little emphasis on  the 























































































































II,  with  the  integration  of  antitrust  and  banking  law,  which marked a move toward 
upholding competition in banking after a period of anti-competitive restrictions imposed 
by the government
14. In fact, even though the US introduced a general competition law 
very early on (the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914), a 
specific competition law for banking dates back only to the 1960s (the Bank Holding 
Act was enacted in 1957, the Bank Merger Act in 1960). 
Similarly, in the case of Europe: “For a long time, banking in many countries was 
exempted from the reach of competition law and subjected to regulation only. As a 
consequence  of  deregulation,  this  is  different  today.  For  example  on  the  matter  of 
mergers,  banks  in  the  EU  are  fully  subjected  to  EU  competition  law.  In  this  way, 
competition  policy  and  regulatory  interests  can  become  intertwined  and  enter  into 
conflict” (Canoy et al., 2001, p. 31). 
However, since the 1980s, there has been a general reassessment of public policy in 
banking, with pro-competition policies emerging in the wake of structural, behavioural 
and  technical  developments,  and  changes  to  the  banking  law.  In  recent  times,  the 
banking  market  has  felt  the  effects  of  novel  trends,  such  as  the  relaxation  of 
geographical  constraints  and  the  lifting  of  restrictions  on  the  scope  of  activity,  an 
unprecedented  movement  toward  bank  mergers,  a  sharp  decline  in  the  number  of 
banking institutions, and the advent of secondary markets and new systems of payment--
all of which presage a fundamental transformation in the industry.  
Beginning in the 1980s, the European Commission and the national governments 
initiated  a  so-called  "competitive  deregulation"  process,  embodied  in  the  Banking 
Directives  (first 77/780 and  second 89/646) as well as the Own Funds (89/299 and 
91/633) and Solvency Ratio Directives (89/647 and 94/7). This opened the way to the 
abolition of restrictions within the European common market, under the principle of 
mutual  recognition.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Basle  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision began formulating a series of capital adequacy requirements, starting from 
the agreement of 1988.  
Despite the recent  thrust toward increased  competitiveness, competition policy in 
banking  remains  atypical  due  to  the  issue  of  financial  market  stability.  This 
subordination of competition to stability continues to dictate the adoption of supervision 

























































Generally speaking, in the banking sector national antitrust authorities are confronted 
not so much with cases of abuse of dominant position, but rather with cases of cartels 
and especially mergers, resulting from the concentration process that has in recent years 
characterised, and continues to strongly characterise, this sector
15. Now, the specific 
case of mergers and acquisitions is an interesting example of the peculiar manner in 
which competition, and the authorities charged with upholding it, are dealt with in the 
banking sector.  
As we know, merger and acquisition operations unite two formerly independent firms 
into a single entity, and are generally forbidden if they result in a dominant position that 
can in some way impair and/or restrict competition
16. Or, alternatively, the operation 
may be authorised on condition that certain correctives are applied to neutralise its anti-
competitive effects. However, in banking all these decisions, and the manner in which 
they are taken, are once again influenced by the implicit or explicit consideration of a 
trade-off between stability and competition.  
There is, first of all, a widespread belief that larger sized banks, with the resultant 
attenuation of competition, can help protect against systemic instability, and this view to 
some extent prejudices the decisions. This position is also consistent with the theory of 
scale  and  scope  economies,  according  to  which  organisational  fixed  costs  imply 
economies of scale while the joint provision of deposit and credit activities can produce 
important scope economies
17.  
A  further  indication  of  the  special  status  granted  to  this  market  is  the  peculiar 
attribution of competencies over competition to institutions different from the antitrust 
authorities. Despite differences between countries attributable to historical legacies not 
directly linked to the efficiency-stability paradigm, and to varying preferences accorded 
to  the  authorities  responsible  for  bank  competition  and  financial  stability,  we  can 
nonetheless say that the banking market everywhere enjoys a privileged status. 
Looking for example at the situation in certain European nations, it should first of all 
be borne in mind that, in the European Union, national institutions are competent to 
decide on mergers below ‘community dimension’, whereas the Merger Task Force of 
the  European  Commission  (DG  Competition)  handles  those  which  exceed  this 
dimension
18. 
In  France,  the  body  responsible  for  reviewing  bank  mergers  is  the  ‘Comité  des 























































































































charge of prudential supervision in the financial sector, headed by the Governor of the 
Banque de France. The criteria applied by the Comité are not those defined in general 
competition law, but rather those defined in banking law, where the stability objective 
strongly prevails over competition.  
In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office is entitled to issue a first opinion on bank 
mergers, based principally on the application of competition law. However, before a 
merger  can  be  blocked  it  is  also  necessary  to  have  the  approval  of  the  Federal 
Supervisory Office,  which examines the case from the perspective of banking law, and 
therefore also taking into account considerations of stability. Moreover, if the opinions 
of  the  Cartel  and  Supervisory  offices  are  not  in  agreement,  bank  mergers  can  be 
submitted  for  political  review  to  the  Federal  Minister  for  Economics,  who  issues  a 
decision based upon macroeconomic and common welfare considerations. 
In  United  Kingdom,  bank  mergers  are  reviewed  through  the  application  of 
competition law, in the same way as any industry. Only in cases of particular importance 
a report from the Office of Fair trading is also requested. So, although the Financial 
Services  Authority  and  the  Bank  of  England  are  consulted  during  the  process, 
considerations of stability are comparatively less influential
19. 
In  Italy,  the  primacy  of  the  stability  objective  over  competition  has  led  to 
responsibility  for  competition  policy  being  transferred  from  the  antitrust  authority 
(Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato) to the banking market supervision 
authority,  the  Banca  d’Italia,  which  also  handles  antitrust  issues  and  therefore  any 
conflicts  arising  from  the  application  of  the  two.  This  is  true  across  the  board  for 
mergers,  while  in  general  antitrust  practice  there  is  an  occasional  overlapping  of 
competencies that is a feature peculiar to the Italian financial system
20. In fact, although 
Law no. 287 of 1990 which instituted the Autorità does include credit institutions under 
the scope of application of antitrust discipline, treating them in the same way as any 
other business, it also assigns enforcement of this discipline to the Banca d’Italia
21.  
In  the  case  of  bank  mergers  which  exceed  the  community  dimension,  these  are 
examined by the Merger Task Force of the European Commission, which applies the EC 
Merger  Regulation,  as  is  for  any  industry.  However,  in  its  process  for  examining 
mergers, the Commission requests all the necessary information from the competent 

























































raise  concerns  over  stability.  Having  said  that,  in  its  activities  as  a  whole  the 
Commission generally tends to emphasise competition aspects. 
Ultimately, despite the fact that the community approach to mergers of community 
dimension is strongly competition-oriented in theory, there is no specific community-
wide supervision authority, so that European nations retain a certain degree of discretion 
in practice, through the involvement of their national supervisors who look at mergers 
from a prudential perspective
22. 
Therefore, in the decision-making on mergers at both the national and community 
level, we once again detect a friction between stability and competition, and here again 
banking emerges as  a peculiar market heavily influenced by monetary and financial 
policies, and generally by the views of central banks and other member-state authorities 
charged with financial stability. 
 'HPDQGDVDSURFRPSHWLWLYHGHYLFHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVGUDZQIURP
WKHQHZLQGXVWULDOHFRQRPLFV
The  analysis  so  far  has  repeatedly  highlighted  the  conflict  between  regulation 
considered necessary for assuring the stability of national and international economic 
systems,  and  antitrust  laws,  which  instead  appear  necessary  for  assuring  market 
efficiency.  The  recurring  theme,  therefore,  is  that  regulation  is  the  inefficient  but 
necessary solution by  which competition is sacrificed to serve the ‘greater good’ of 
economic stability.  In the paragraphs that follow we shall propose an alternative means 
of resolving this dilemma, based on the new industrial economics. 
The central idea of this alternative solution is encapsulated in the following general 
principle,  which  has  been  emerging  in  the  industrial  economics  literature:  when 
competition is limited for whatever reason on the supply side, it can be at least partially 
stimulated  on  the  demand  side,  provided  that  sufficient  consumer  mobility  can  be 
induced
23. In certain industries, for example, competition may be restricted or impeded 
due  to  structural  reasons.  Within  such  contexts,  antitrust  enforcement  is  largely 
irrelevant because it is barred from removing the cause of inefficiency, and in any case 
can  only  be  sporadically  applied.  However  in  certain  situations  this  rigidity  can  be 
sidestepped, by approaching the analysis from the consumer' s perspective, if there are 























































































































the firms. In such circumstances, these same elements can be leveraged to pursue a pro-
competitive  policy.  However  such  actions  lie  outside  the  province  of  conventional 
antitrust practice, which generally looks only at the supply side, so that a novel approach 
is called for.  
One  situation where the above approach could be applied is the case of lock-ins, 
which prevent consumer mobility from one product to the other. This is an issue that has 
been widely debated in the technology sector, where incompatibility between different 
technical components can attribute market power to a particular firm. The precedent-
setting case on this matter was that of photocopy machines and their spare parts
24, so 
that the literature in question generally makes reference to markets for durable goods 
and their related markets, which are termed ‘aftermarkets’
25. It is still possible, in some 
cases, for antitrust authorities to take direct action against firms that pursue allegedly 
abusive strategies and, in such circumstances, the remedies will be the traditional ones. 
But even when such conventional remedies are impracticable, competition can still be 
promoted through policies that enable consumers to choose alternative products. 
Looking now specifically at the banking sector, we find certain significant affinities 
with  the  situation  described  above:  this  is  in  effect  a  market  where  repetitive 
consumption over time presents analogies with the previous representation, with the 
opening of an account or acquisition of a service constituting the primary market, while 
the continuation of this relationship in subsequent years generates the aftermarkets. In 
other words, for reasons connected with the cost of switching, consumers face a problem 
of compatibility between their initial purchase and successive purchases, and this locks 
them into the original provider, conferring market power to that firm. 
In light of this, therefore, the existence of competition at an initial time W does not 
guarantee  that  competition  will  continue  to  exist  in  subsequent  periods,  with  the 
paradoxical outcome that even a firm with no apparent market power when competing 
for new clients might nevertheless exert market power over its acquired consumers, who 
in a sense constitute a specific relevant market
26.  
One likely explanation for the persistency of consumption is hence the existence of 
switching costs, whose origins can either be structural, i.e. relating to certain exogenous 
attributes of the sector, or strategic, i.e. endogenously determined by the firms in order 

























































costs lock consumers into their initial purchase, thereby conferring a certain degree of 
market power to the original provider. 
In  the  case  of  exogenously  determined  switching  costs,  the  level  of  market 
competition can be elevated through additional regulatory intervention, and this--at least 
in Europe--falls outside the remit of the antitrust legislation and authorities. In the case 
of switching costs that are endogenously determined, i.e. for the explicit purpose of 
acquiring market power, antitrust enforcement could theoretically be applied, though 
this proves difficult in practice because the judgement will inevitably have an arbitrary 
component, requiring application of a ‘rule of reason’ on a case by case basis
27.And 
such  a  judgement  becomes  even  more  difficult  where  there  are  H[DQWH reasons  for 
restricting antitrust actions, as is the case in the banking sector.  
 'HPDQGVLGHUHVWULFWLRQVRQFRPSHWLWLRQVZLWFKLQJFRVWV
Promoting  competition  on  the  demand  side  should  not  be  seen  as  a  universal 
alternative applicable to every market structure, but rather as a remedy geared to specific 
markets where certain peculiar features characterise the relationship between consumers 
and  firms:  namely    the  existence  of  switching  costs,  which  are  exploited  to  secure 
market power over particular segments of demand, thereby restricting competition. The 
remaining sections shall first of all describe the nature of such costs and their workings 
in the market, before proceeding to identify the specific types of switching costs found 
in  the banking industry. This with a view to formulating policy indications that are 
specific to that context, but extensible (and have in part already been applied, though not 
systematically) to other markets as well. 
7KHQDWXUHRIVZLWFKLQJFRVWV
Switching  costs  can  emerge  in  markets  that  are  characterised  by  repeated 
consumption. Within such markets, consumers who initially purchase a good or service 
from a firm will remain ' loyal'  to that firm in order to avoid incurring these costs again at 
a  later  date.  This  has  the  effect  of  weakening  the  substitutability  between  (even 
identical) products, once the initial act of consumption has been made.  
So even if price competition exists at an initial time W, when firms are attracting new 























































































































repeat the purchase, due to the effect of switching costs
28.  We can therefore say, in this 
scenario,  that  at  a  time  WQ  (where  Q=1,2,..)  the  existence  of  switching  costs  can 
transform the relationship between firm and consumer in the relevant market. This in 
itself clearly complicates the antitrust analysis, because the implied dynamic perspective 
creates more scope for ambiguity, unless--as we saw earlier--concrete reasons exist for 
attributing the emergence of switching costs to clearly abusive behaviours.  
There is a vast body of literature in economic theory devoted to switching costs, in 
which their impact on competition is examined from a variety of starting assumptions, 
such as whether consumers do or do not have perfect information
29. Now, although no 
univocal conclusion exists, as a general principle (setting aside special cases in which 
switching costs do not compromise competition) we can say that such costs generally 
confer a certain amount of market power to firms, precisely by virtue of the exclusive tie 
which they create (or which is purposely created) between consumers and the firm. This 
is indirectly confirmed, for example, by the structural persistence of above-marginal 
cost pricing, even where there is apparent competition for the capture of new consumers, 
and by the emergence of multi-product firms not attributable to scope economies, but 
rather  to  forms  of  scale  economies  on  the  demand  side,  deriving  precisely  from  a 
consumers’ desire to amortise switching costs
30.  
The  balance  of  collective  welfare  which  results  is  usually  negative,  because 
“switching costs generally raise prices and create deadweight losses of the usual kind 
[…]  and  may  also  discourage  new  entry  and  so  further  reduce  the  market 
competitiveness” (Klemperer, 1995, p. 536)
31. 
The conventional representation of switching costs is as a sunk investment (effective 
or perceived) made by consumers, which creates a certain inertia in the choice between 
apparently identical alternatives
32. 
Such an investment can be  ' real' , for example connected with issues of technical 
compatibility, as in the case of a decoder for a particular pay-TV system, which would 
need to be replaced if the consumer switched to a new provider. Or it can be ' perceived' , 
for example connected with the effort expended by the user to research a particular 
purchase, which would have to be repeated to select an alternative, or the time invested 
in becoming proficient with a new system, which creates a path-dependence, as in the 
learning curves confronted by computer users. It can also take the form of transaction 

























































intermediation charges. And finally, there are also switching costs associated with the 
emotional  sphere,  when  the  user’s  familiarity  with  a  particular  product  or  service 
engenders a sort of affective dependency. This is in fact one of the mechanisms at the 
root of brand loyalty, and of course the effect can also be enhanced by artificial means, 
through  commercial  initiatives  such  as  cumulative  discount  schemes  (for  example 
airline ’frequent flyer’ programmes), or coupons promotions.  
It should be emphasised that the existence of switching costs does not in itself imply 
behaviours in  violation of the antitrust laws. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, 
from the standpoint of firms switching costs do help create market power, and thus have 
a beneficial effect on profits, especially if price discrimination can be practiced between 
old and new consumers. The monopoly pockets thus created will naturally have the side-
effect of rationing demand. The cost of switching might prompt certain individuals not 
to consume at all, with a distorting effect on the allocation of resources. And further 
distorting  the  market  structure  is  the  emergence  of  multi-product  firms.  In  fact,  if 
switching costs encourage consumers to source a variety of products or services from 
the same firm, by the same token they encourage firms to diversify into a variety of 
products and services, even inefficiently, exploiting the fact that consumers have already 
been ’captured’ by their original purchase. 
This  mechanism  can  in  its  turn  constitute  a  form  of  market  foreclosure  against 
potential  competitors  who  are  able  to  efficiently  produce  only  a  single  product  or 
service
33.  
However, although it is fairly straightforward to describe the anti-competitive effect 
of switching costs, it is rather more difficult to identify behaviours that are clearly anti-
competitive,  and  therefore  punishable  by  the  authorities.  In  other  words,  because 
switching costs can arise for so many different reasons, it can sometimes be difficult to 
determine  their  causes  and  judge  whether  they  are  explicitly  anti-competitive.  As  a 
general principle, switching costs can be likened to a product differentiation strategy, so 
that  although  the  underlying  rent-seeking  logic  is  quite  clear,  a  univocal  antitrust 
interpretation is more difficult: in the same way that a promotional campaign causes two 
objectively identical products to become differentiated in the eyes of consumers (we 
speak in this case of perceived differentiation), switching costs introduce an H[SRVW























































































































Ultimately, the crux of the antitrust enforcement is the nature of the costs, which can 
be simultaneously exogenous, i.e. arising from structural features of the market and/or 
technology in question, or endogenous, i.e. arising from strategic policy decisions taken 
by firms to create market power, in much the same way as with product differentiation. 
It is only in rare cases that unequivocally abusive behaviours will emerge, although 
switching costs always create some amount of market power, and must thus have a 
correspondingly anti-competitive effect. 
6ZLWFKLQJFRVWVDQGWKHEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\
In  the  discussion  so  far  we  have  already  mentioned  the peculiar structure of  the 
banking  market,  characterised  by  considerable  rigidity  on  the  supply  side--largely  a 
result  of  the  regulation--and  by  high  switching  costs--associated  with  repeated  
consumption and various endogenous and exogenous traits of this sector, such as multi-
product  supply,  market  power  over  consumers,  etc.
34.  For  example,  the  discrepancy 
between  the  interest  rates  offered  to  savers  and  those  earned  by  banks  on  their 
investments,  which  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market  ought  to  coincide  (minus  the 
operating intermediation costs), is a sign of market power which can be accounted for 
by the existence of switching costs
35  
A growing body of literature supports the key role played by switching costs in the 
banking sector, although few studies have as yet attempted to define the magnitude of 
this effect, or to examine possible policy indications from an antitrust perspective
36. In 
any  case,  the  costs  in  question  are  sufficiently  high  to  discourage  movement  of 
consumers from one bank to another, even where there are large differences in charges 
and interest rates, making them a significant constituent of banks profits
37.  
Switching costs appear in a variety of forms and can also be added together, thereby 
reinforcing their overall effect. The following paragraphs provide a brief, and by no 
means exhaustive, taxonomy specific to the banking sector. One category of switching 
costs are those relating to direct-debit payments from a customer’s bank account for 
utilities and other bills, for example phone, gas, electricity, credit cards, and so forth. 
And  of  course  a  similar  consideration  applies  to  credit  transfer  operations  into  the 
account, such as the payment of salaries or other remunerations, dividends, and so forth. 
On  closing  the  account  the  customer  would have to  transfer  all the aforementioned 


























































38.  Further  compounding  these  are  costs  relating  to  uncertainty,  due  to  the 
possibility of oversights or errors occurring during the transfer
39. 
The transfer times themselves are highly variable, and generally take longer than 
theoretically  necessary,  suggesting  possible  strategic  behaviours  pursued  by  the 
originator banks expressly to increase the cost of switching
40. 
Surveys of Italian operators have found that banks explicitly take such costs into 
account, and generally advise their staff to activate as many services as possible when a 
customer  opens  an  account
41.    A  similar  conclusion  was reached in  the UK by  the 
Competition Commission (2001, sect. 1.6 and 1.8) which found that personal current 
accounts “the core product in personal banking […] also serve as ‘gateway’ through 
which suppliers can sell other financial product, such as credit cards and personal loans 
[…]”, thus raising the overall switching costs
42.  
A similar trend exists in the US, where competition in banking is increasingly centred 
not so much on individual products as on the provision of bundles of services
43. 
Then  there  are  additional  switching  costs  associated  with  the  information  that 
consumers need to collect when deciding to open an account, and with the fixed fee 
normally charged for opening the account: both these elements fall under the category of 
start-up  costs,  i.e.  those  costs  that  are  unavoidably  incurred  when  entering  into  a 
relationship with a bank, and which must be repeated whenever the individual starts 
again with a different supplier
44.  
Finally  there  is  a  category  of  switching  costs  associated  with  the  bank' s  direct 
knowledge of the customer and, conversely, the latter' s familiarity with the bank. This 
makes  many  operations  quicker  and  easier,  because  the  bank  staff  are  directly 
acquainted with customer and his history of solvency/insolvency and so forth. In the 
transfer to a new bank, all this accumulated background information will be lost. The 
bank customer, on his part, is likewise facilitated by familiarity with the procedures and 
staff, making it more convenient to continue with the existing bank rather than have to 
get used to a new one
45. 
It is important to remember that, taken individually, each of the switching costs listed 
so far can be relatively small, and not bring much market power by itself. Nevertheless, 
through the cumulative effect of various costs, it is possible to achieve considerable 























































































































Some authors have pointed out that this mechanism is offset by an implicit trade-off 
in the exploitation of switching costs, because the exercise of market power must be 
weighed  against  competitiveness  in  attracting  new  consumers.  However  in  this 
particular  sector,  as  mentioned  previously,  such  costs  appear  to  have  a  significant 
impact on the profits of banks
46.  
There is some fragmented evidence in support of this in the literature. For example, a 
study of the Norwegian mortgage market was found that 25% of the marginal profit of 
banks (i.e. the profit arising from each additional borrower) could essentially be ascribed 
to the lock-in effect, with the bank-client relationship lasting on average 13.5 years
47. 
This span of time is consistent with the values found in both the European and US 
markets
48.  This confirms, at least in part, that the market power deriving from switching 
costs  is  being  exploited,  and  does  have  an  impact  on  competitive  mechanisms  and 
market outcomes. And many other signs further corroborate this assertion. For example, 
the phenomenon of diminishing interest rates on bank accounts--whereby higher rates 
are offered on opening the account and then gradually decreased--would seem consistent 
with the hypothesis that, as the relationship is prolonged in time, and the switching costs 
consequently increase, a lower remuneration is needed to retain the consumer. 
A corollary to the above assertions is the empirical fact that the principal reason for 
which consumers switch banks is when they move house--in other words a drastic event 
that incurs very high overall transaction costs, which far exceed the switching costs 
themselves
49.  
All  this  is  not  to  suggest,  however,  that  the  banking  industry  is  pervaded  by 
systematically  abusive  behaviours.  Such  an  interpretation  is  unjustified  because  the 
behaviours are to some extent structurally determined by the particular conditions in 
which competition is played out, which are largely defined H[OHJH. In a sense, switching 
costs are built into the peculiar relationship between customer and bank, so that the 
market configuration makes them inevitable in the current context. What is more, the 
related observation--that firms strive to increase these costs to secure new pockets of 
monopoly--is  also  open  to  ambiguous  interpretations,  because  this  is  in  effect  a 
competitive strategy in the particular market structure. 
Irrespective  of  the  market,  any  practice  that  shifts  competition  onto  non-price 
elements has the aim of attenuating price competition, and in this sense must have a 

























































rational  and  competitive  course  of  actions  for  firms  operating  in  a  peculiar  market 
structure.  They  constitute  rent-seeking  behaviours  only  to  the  same  extent  as  does 
advertising or product differentiation, and so are not punishable on this count by the 
antitrust authority.  
We note also that, when antitrust enforcement falls outside the price competition 
paradigm,  and  unless  there  is  clear  circumstantial  evidence  of  infractions,  it  faces 
increasing difficulties because the analytical tools available are to some extent obsolete, 
and  referred  chiefly  to  static  price-based  competitive  paradigms  which  are  not  very 
useful in complex contexts
50. 
 3ROLF\LQGLFDWLRQV
The conventional analysis framework has accustomed us to look at competition from 
the supply side and to approach its stimulation from the perspective of firms.  In this 
paper we have instead shown how, in the banking market, competition on the supply 
side is institutionally restricted by the imperative of assuring the stability of the banking 
system, and the economic system as a whole.   
This  creates a significant problem for  the  application of  antitrust law, because  it 
interferes substantially with regulatory activity. For example, if we accept the antitrust 
approach  which  interprets  competition  laws  as  tools  "for  prohibiting  bigness  or 
facilitating ease of entry for small businesses" (Howenkamp, 1994, p. 275), the natural 
result  is  a  profound  ambiguity.  The  obvious  solution  would  in  fact  be,  as  Justice 
Brandeis said in a celebrated US case, to punish practices that ‘destroy’ competition
51. 
However in our particular case this route is precluded by definition, and what is more 
the practices in question are (ambiguously) competitive in the banking sector, due to the 
context created by the regulation.  
This last observation once again raises the conventional antitrust dilemma of per se 
rules  versus  rules  of  reason.  Application  of  the  latter  criterion,  with  the  attendant 
connotations of political motivation and expediency, will tend to make decisions appear 
less absolute and objective, more open to question
52. With, in this case, the aggravating 
factor  that  the  underlying  assumptions  of the  regulation have the practical  effect of 























































































































For  these  reasons,  there  seems  to  be  very  little  scope,  overall,  for  increasing 
competition  through  traditional  antitrust  interventions  directed  at  behaviours  on  the 
supply side.  
But  by  turning  to  a  different  antitrust  tradition--namely  that  which  pursues  the 
objective  of  maximising  consumer  welfare--it  is  possible  to  map  out  an  alternative 
strategy of demand-side interventions, as has in fact already been done in some other 
markets, though not in any systematic manner. 
The idea is to precisely pinpoint and remove the elements that inhibit competition, 
not by altering the competitive scenario as such, but simply by operating in the sphere of 
consumers. In the case in point, if switching costs (coupled with the effects of national 
regulations)  are  one  of  the  main  sources  of  market  power  for  firms,  a  competitive 
equilibrium may be approached by taking explicit actions to reduce such costs
53. 
Such a strategy has already been successfully deployed to increase competition in 
certain other sectors. In the telephone industry, for example, liberalisation of the so-
called ’last mile’ has enabled many countries to introduce competition into a sector that 
appeared  locked  into  monopoly  positions  arising  from  historical  inertia.  Something 
similar has occurred in the sector of car liability insurance, through the introduction of a 
more effective system based on the portability of the insured party’s risk status, and 
efforts to combat fraudulent practices. So taking precisely this insurance market as a 
model, one could envisage applying a similar system to the banking industry as well. 
The  relationship  between  a  customer  and  bank,  much  like  that  between  insurance 
companies and their clients, is one of long standing that involves collection of a large 
data set, and is generally characterised by high transaction costs.  
But notwithstanding these similarities, the sector of car liability insurance has seen a 
gradual reduction in its switching costs: contracts are generally annual and renewable, 
and  customers  are  able to switch between different companies without loss of data, 
thanks  to  a  standardised  procedure  that  guarantees  the  accuracy  of  the  information 
received by the new company, and retains any benefits (such as no-claims bonuses) 
matured with the original insurer.  
A similar strategy could be deployed within the banking sector, in order to promote 
increased  competition  without  compromising  the  overall  market  structure,  and  so 

























































Some cautious moves in this direction have recently been attempted, though as yet 
not backed by an explicit theoretical position or clear economic policy. In a recent case 
of a proposed merger between two British banks, Lloyds TSB and Abbey National, the 
Competition Commission (2001, sect. 1.11) notes for example that “Steps are being 
taken to improve the process of switching personal current accounts between banks. 
This is important in creating conditions for the market to become more competitive 
[… ]. The current project to automate the necessary exchanges of information must be 
completed and effectively implemented without delay and the process must be speeded 
up.” In the same market, a slightly earlier study underlined the need to ensure greater 
transparency and, most importantly, greater representativiness to consumers
54.  
So an added advantage of the proposed solution is that, because it still passes through 
regulatory channels, unified control of the market can be retained. The market structure 
is ultimately not altered in any way and can continue to be defined in agreement with the 
stability objective. The increased mobility of consumers between the various banks on 
the market will simply have the primary effect of reducing the market power that each 
firm exerts over its locked consumers (arising from the switching costs). However the 
resultant increase in competition and efficiency will only minimally impact upon the 
likelihood  of  failure  and  subsequent  contagion,  because  both  entry  and  exit  remain 
regulated, and the banks are diversified into other submarkets such as financial products 
sold to large firms, wholesale banking, and so on.  
 &RQFOXVLYHUHPDUNV
This contribution has addressed the central dilemma of the banking sector, that of 
stability  versus  competition,  and  attempted  to  identify  a  novel  solution.  In  fact,  the 
prevailing  idea,  in  the  abundant  literature  on  the  subject,  is  that  a  trade-off  exists 
between these two objectives, and that competition must largely be sacrificed to the 
greater  good  of  economic  stability.  The  result  is  an  inevitable  antagonism  between 
regulatory activities and those which promote competition.  
The thesis presented in this work does not attempt to refute this antagonism, but 
more simply leverages unexplored market resources in order to obtain an alternative 
competition  strategy  that  sidesteps  the  problem.  The  proposed  solution  involves 























































































































supply. More specifically, the existence of exogenous and endogenous switching costs 
makes it possible to pursue pro-competition policies that do not require imposition of 
penalties or changes to the market structure, but focus instead on eliminating the lock-in 
mechanisms,  and  hence  the  market  power  and  inefficiencies  associated  with  them. 
Although the described solution is undoubtedly a second-best alternative, it nevertheless 
makes it possible to pursue the goal of consumer welfare maximisation, which is one of 
the stated aims of antitrust policies. 
An analysis of the specific competitive attributes of the banking market - equally 
found in other markets - also indicates that there is an entire area as yet unexplored by 
antitrust practice, which could be exploited to at least partially pursue the efficiency 
objective,  in  contexts  where  competition  appears  to  be  structurally  ruled  out.  In 
particular, such a solution could provide a new and alternative route for stimulating 
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